As George Lakoff points out, Bush isn't incompetent,
he's an effective conservative. But one of the scarier motivations behind the "diplomacy by force" agenda implicitly pushed by the new American century adherents is the flawed perception that oppressed peoples don't have the incentive, let alone the provocation to rise up against their tyrants. Thus the need for American military intervention.
Unfortunately, this theory exalts a hubristic vision over the lessons of history. It neglects the realization that there is a limit to a foreign army's ability to shape foreign politics for the good. Our military involvement in Vietnam, Lebanon, the Philippines, Cuba (prior to Castro) and Panama, or European imperialist endeavors around the globe should have taught us this lesson. Democracy needs to be an organic, homegrown movement, as it was in this country. If we believe so deeply in our ideals, they will speak for themselves and inspire others.
The problem with this armageddonist back-seat driving is
that is the same logic originally used by Islamic fundamentalists and the Bolsheviks before them.
Every terrorist operation is designed to "incite the people" so that they may be blinded by some proverbial cleansing light, recognize their futile complacency and overcome the morally bankrupt despots who rule their lands. Each action had to be more gruesome than the previous ones that failed to accomplish this goal. Whether it was the assassination of Anwar Sadat, the beheading of Nick Berg, or the brutal slaughter of Tsar Nicholas II and family, the stated goal behind the act was the same — to shock, awe and incite.
While it may have started the revolutionary ball rolling in Russia (though it wasn't long before another, more bloodthirsty tyrant took charge), it hasn't worked in the Middle East. Why did this administration think it would be different this time? In the brief but relatively focused weeks after the Iraq invasion, it may have appeared that perhaps this time the once misanthropic civilization would join their liberators in rejecting their regime and begin the process of democratizing themselves. However, the exact moment when the new boss became the same as the old boss cannot be easily pinpointed, but that is the case. Was it when the clueless soldier covered the head of the toppled Saddam statue with an American flag? Was it when the photos of Abu Ghraib surfaced after all the assurances of the demise of the rape rooms?
The terror operations conducted by insurgents and militias (and perhaps those occasionally committed by Marines) in Iraq are once again designed to spur the gentry to jettison their status quo. The administration tells us that history will judge whether or not combatting these factions is resulting in a more stable and democratic Iraq, but a
glance at their nascent constitution already suggests
it is not. In the meantime, the cycle of violence, chaos and death continues to roll along in a track that has merely become muddier.
